Perceptions of Mortality Risk: Implications for Annuities by Drinkwater, Matthew & Sondergeld, Eric T
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1-1-2003 
Perceptions of Mortality Risk: Implications for Annuities 
Matthew Drinkwater 
LIMRA 
Eric T. Sondergeld 
LIMRA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Drinkwater, Matthew and Sondergeld, Eric T., "Perceptions of Mortality Risk: Implications for Annuities" 
(2003). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 436. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/436 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2004 publication: Pension Design and Structure: 
New Lessons from Behavioral Finance. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/436 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Perceptions of Mortality Risk: Implications for Annuities 
Abstract 
This chapter examines how people view and manage mortality risks in retirement. While the chances of 
dying are small in any given retirement year, the financial consequences of untimely (early or late) death 
can be important. Consumers attempting to incorporate mortality risks into their retirement strategy are 
often told to use life expectancy estimates, even though life expectancy is an inadequate and often 
inappropriate planning concept. Moreover, consumers are usually invited to use the same approach to 
post-retirement retirement planning as pre-retirement financial planning, which undermines the 
importance of mortality risk and the role of products such as income annuities that provide protection 
against such risk. Recent research investigating the perception and management of various retirement 
risks, has important implications for annuity providers. 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2004 publication: Pension Design and 
Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral Finance. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/436 
Pension Design 
and Structure
New Lessons from
Behavioral Finance
EDITED BY
Olivia S. Mitchell and 
Stephen P. Utkus
1
Utkas-Fm.qxd 27/5/04 3:24 PM Page iii
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© Pension Research Council, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2004
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
ISBN 0-19-927339-1
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk
Utkas-Fm.qxd 27/5/04 3:24 PM Page iv
Chapter 15
Perceptions of Mortality Risk: Implications
for Annuities
Matthew Drinkwater and Eric T. Sondergeld
This chapter reviews recent research investigating how retirees and near-
retirees perceive and manage mortality risks. Of particular interest are the
implications of decision processes regarding mortality risk for annuity
buying behavior. For example, if people assume that they will not live very
long in retirement, they will be less motivated to convert a portion of their
assets into guaranteed lifetime income, than if they were concerned about
outliving assets. Understanding the decisionmaking process is important for
at least two reasons. First, faulty decisions regarding mortality risk will stress
the resources of family members, government programs, and society in
general. Greater reliance on income annuities and other products could alle-
viate this burden (Bodie, Hammond, and Mitchell, 2000). Second, retirees
themselves tend to report greater satisfaction when they possess guaranteed
income sources, aside from social security (MetLife, 2002; Sondergeld,
Drinkwater, and Jamison, 2002b ; Panis, Chapter 14, this volume).
The primary mortality risk facing people during their working years is
dying too soon, a fact that boosts the demand for traditional life insurance.
For retirees, by contrast, the primary mortality risk is dying later than
expected, or living longer than financial resources can support people’s
desired standard of living. Longevity risk can thus be defined as the possibility
that a person will outlive his savings and be forced to reduce his living stand-
ard. A related concern for married retirees is spousal mortality risk, defined as
the possibility that one spouse will die and cause a significant decrease in the
surviving spouse’s standard of living. This is, of course, a concern at any life
stage but, married retirees may face particularly negative consequences when
widowed compared to working age individuals. For example, especially for
older women, the loss of a spouse can reduce social security benefits, pensions,
and annuity income. Moreover, the death of a partner can also bring about
the loss of non-financial benefits such as care-giving and other support.
To confront longevity risk, individuals can delay retirement to a later age
if they believe that this decision could reduce their risk of outliving savings
or increase their chances of maintaining a desired living standard during
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retirement. The insurance industry markets products designed to protect
against both losses, due to earlier or later-than-expected death. To insure
against the risk of living longer than expected, people can annuitize a portion
of their assets, using employer-sponsored retirement plan assets, Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) balances, or deferred annuity assets, or they can
purchase lifetime annuities. Choosing a “joint and last survivor” annuity
allows the income stream to continue (often at a reduced rate) upon the
death of the first or pre-specified annuitant, thereby addressing spousal
mortality risk. Along with annuities, life insurance can mitigate the financial
impact of a spouse’s death by providing a tax-free lump sum payment, all or
part of which could be converted into an annuity.
Mortality Risk Perceptions
While it is straightforward to explain how individual insurance products help
address mortality risk, it is difficult to measure how people recognize it
and make decisions to handle it. As Weber (this volume) describes, this risk
perception is often driven by affective processes which may ultimately lead to
suboptimal risk management. It is therefore interesting that, on average,
older people appear to be relatively good at predicting their life expectancy
(Sondergeld, Drinkwater, and Jamison, 2002b). Depending on the mortality
table chosen, retirees and those within 2 years of retirement mis-estimate their
longevity only slightly (Table 15-1). Retirees were found to underestimate
their life expectancy by 2.5 years when their estimates were compared to an
actuarial mortality table developed for annuitants, but they overestimate by
one year when compared to a general population mortality table. Women tend
to be much less optimistic than men: Female retirees’ subjective estimates are
as much as 5 years too low. Hurd and McGarry (1997) also demonstrate that
subjective survival probabilities aggregate to life table averages.
Nevertheless, mortality remains a difficult concept for people to under-
stand, one that many prefer not to contemplate. Consequently, consumers
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TABLE 15-1 Subjective Longevity Expectations Less Actuarial Life Expectancy
Mortality Table Males Females All
Annuity 2000 Basic Near-retirees 0.1 2.5 1.2
Retirees 0.9 5.0 2.5
US (SSA AS 107) 1990 Near-retirees 3.4 0.3 1.6
Retirees 2.7 1.5 1.0
Notes : Actuarial life expectancy determined using the Annuity 2000 Basic Table ( Johansen,
1998) and Social Security Administration Actuarial Study (SSA AS107; Bell, Wade, and
Goss, 1992). Near-retirees are aged 50–70 within 2 years of retirement; retirees are aged
55–78 and retired (self-defined).
Source : Sondergeld, Drinkwater, and Jamison (2002b).
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often use life expectancies when retirement planning exercises. A recent
study found that one-third of retirees, and 46 percent of near-retirees,
assumed that they would live to a certain age when they were planning the
details of their retirements (Sondergeld et al., 2003b). The problem is that
using this benchmark exposes them to the risk of outliving their planning
horizon. Indeed, 11 percent of the retirees surveyed had already outlived
their earlier determined planning horizons. One reason consumers take this
viewpoint is that prevailing retirement planning software programs virtually
all use life expectancy as the default planning horizon (Sondergeld et al.,
2003a). While some programs incorporate techniques (such as Monte Carlo
simulation) that treat future investment returns as a stochastic variable, they
still assume a retiree’s date of death is deterministic. To counter such deter-
minism, consumers must learn that life expectancy is only an average; but it
is not terribly helpful for planning retirement needs. Illustrations that make
use of survival probabilities for each year of retirement can be much more
instructive in demonstrating the likelihood of an individual surviving to
specific ages, and married individuals should understand that the chance of
at least one spouse in the couple surviving to older ages is much greater.
Previous research has not examined how mortality risk is perceived by the
general public, relative to other concerns faced by retirees and those near
retirement. To evaluate how seniors perceive mortality risk, we surveyed near-
retirees and retirees regarding a variety of retirement risks to determine the
level of concern regarding each. We found that survey respondents were
more concerned with health-related risks, and even financial and investment-
related risks, as compared to mortality risks (see Table 15-2). Only one in five
near-retirees expressed major concern about the impact that outliving assets
could have on their living standard in retirement.
It appears that there are two explanations for this result. First, people
tend to be more concerned with outcomes that could affect them in the
short run, as compared to those of a more long-term nature (Selnow, this
volume). Second, many people do not fully understand the implications or
likelihood of living long, or at least beyond their life expectancies.
Decisionmaking and Judgment
Psychological research has amply demonstrated that people are systematically
biased in their assessments of future events, in such a way that the likelihood
of negative consequences tends to be minimized (Taylor and Brown, 1988;
Weber, Chapter 3, this volume). Moreover, this bias is most pronounced for
estimates about one’s self; not only will the future be good, it will be espe-
cially good for oneself in particular. For example, when asked to predict
whether a specific negative event (e.g. becoming ill, becoming depressed,
having an accident) might happen to them, people have a tendency to
assign a lower chance of these events happening to them than their peers
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(Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Similar results are obtained when the subject matter
involves mortality estimates. In a recent study of retirees, more than six in ten
believed it was likely they and their spouse would outlive the average life
expectancy by more than 10 years (Society of Actuaries, 2002). Sixty-nine
percent of retirees said it was “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that an
average 65-year-old would have to spend at least some time in a nursing
home before death. Yet, the percentage drops when retirees are asked about
themselves: only 43 percent say it is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that
they will have to spend some time in a nursing home before death.
A tendency to positively distort information may promote mental health,
but it can also have serious negative implications. For instance, if most people
underestimate the chance that their spouses will die early in retirement, or
that they or their spouses will live long enough to spend all of their assets,
then they will be less likely to take action and delay retirement or insure
against these risks. Furthermore, mortality estimates have been wrong in the
past, and there is no absolute consensus on how human life expectancy might
shift in the future (Bodie, Hammond, and Mitchell, 2000; Korczyk, 2002).
Other research suggests that having more imprecise probabilistic beliefs
can lead to overly conservative decisionmaking, which in turn can produce
suboptimal financial asset allocations (Lillard and Willis, 2001).
Even if individuals did have valid and reliable information regarding the
probabilities and costs associated with future negative events, there is no
guarantee that they could process it in a fully rational manner (Yaari, 1965).
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TABLE 15-2 Perceived Impact of Retirement Risks on Standard of Living
Risk Near-Retirees Retirees
Prescription drug costs (%) 47 48
Health care costs 45 37
Long-term care costs 37 35
Prolonged stock market downturn 36 29
Provide for spouse if you die 31 31
Tax increases 30 33
Inflation 29 32
Provide for you if spouse dies 22 22
Interest rate decline 20 25
Outlive your assets 20 16
Assistance which may be needed by 14 13
other family members
Notes : Figures represent percent of survey respondents indicating “major concern”
about the impact that each item could have on their standard of living in retirement. 
Near-retirees are aged 50–70 within 2 years of retirement; retirees are aged 55–78 and
retired (self-defined).
Source : Sondergeld, Drinkwater, and Jamison (2002b).
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Indeed, recent research uncovering various cognitive biases and heuristics
used during the decisionmaking process seems to imply that rational pro-
cessing may not be the norm when retirement risks are involved (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Brothers (2002) describes how chosen retirement ages
can be determined by anchor and adjustment heuristics. In that framework,
the worker uses peers’ retirement ages as a baseline, and adjusts his or her
own, relative to his or her “anchor.” Especially if a worker does not believe
that he or she will live very long in retirement (or, alternatively, that he or
she will not face catastrophic healthcare costs), later retirement may be seen
as a “loss” and hence avoided. This may explain the recent survey of prospec-
tive retirees which showed that longer subjective life expectancies are not
associated with older expected retirement ages; in fact, those with longer
subjective life expectancies have lower expected retirement ages (Society of
Actuaries, 2002).
People’s retirement timing decisions could also be “incorrectly” chosen
for other reasons. For example, subjective survival probabilities can embody
individual information not reflected in a life table based solely on age and/or
gender (Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos, 2002). Even when observable covari-
ates such as socio-economic status are controlled for, people may incor-
porate personal private information. Indeed, Hurd and colleagues have
shown that subjective survival probabilities can predict actual measured
mortality, and that people are less likely to claim early (i.e. reduced) social
security benefits when they believe they have a high survival probability
(Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill, 1999; Hurd,
Smith, and Zissimopoulos, 2002). For example, using information from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Hurd and McGarry (1997) found
that participants who had died between data collection waves had signifi-
cantly lower subjective survival probabilities than those who survived.
Related research has also shown that although fewer men delay the onset
of social security benefits than would be expected from optimizing theoret-
ical models, men with longer life expectancies tend to delay longer than
men with shorter life expectancies (Coile et al., 2000).
The decision to delay the receipt of a lifetime benefit such as social security,
however, cannot be equated with the decision to surrender a portion of assets
for an income stream in the form of a payout annuity. Besides the difference
in liquidity implications, usually the decision to annuitize also involves an
additional choice between a lifetime, a joint and last survivor, or a non-
lifetime payout. As will be discussed later in this chapter, lifetime payouts are
not always a popular choice. However, as annuity-writing companies have long
observed, the average life expectancy for a group of annuitants is generally
longer than that of the general population (termed “adverse selection”;
Mitchell and McCarthy, 2001). Clearly, people’s knowledge of their own
mortality plays some role in the decision to voluntarily annuitize.
Some research has demonstrated a rational link between key factors and
annuitization decisions, even when the overall annuitization rate is less than
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what would be expected if people sought optimal solutions. Using the HRS,
Brown (1999) showed that the decision to annuitize responds to mortality
risk, marital status, risk aversion, and the presence of other annuitized wealth
(e.g. Social Security benefits). Hence, annuitization should be more attractive
for nonmarried individuals and those with higher longevity prospects, higher
risk aversion, or fewer annuitized wealth sources. It is these individuals that
will require more wealth than others to replicate the well-being achieved
through annuitization (i.e. they have a higher “annuity equivalent wealth”).
Brown found that, as annuity equivalent wealth increased, so did the plan to
annuitize.
Planning Approaches
Conventional advice regarding retirement income planning recommends
that people select a finite time horizon (e.g. how long they expect to be
retired; invest in a diversified portfolio subject to their risk tolerance, and,
from that, determine how much they can “safely” withdraw annually to sup-
plement their income. This advice mirrors the approach commonly used
in accumulating assets for retirement, where the goal is to determine how
much one must save each year to accumulate a desired asset level by the
assumed retirement date. In retirement, the calculation is how much to take
out, rather than put in, so that there are funds remaining at the “end of
retirement.” In both cases, the individual is effectively solving for the payment
of an annuity certain.1
Of course, risks associated with longevity are not the only factors retirees
face: Other risk factors include health problems, disability, and death of
spouse. Traditionally, these have been covered by employer provided insur-
ance even after retirement, but such coverage has declined overtime. For
instance, the percentage of employers offering retiree health insurance
dropped from 50(44) in 1993 to 36(29) by 2000 for employees retiring
early (for Medicare-eligible retirees; GAO, 2001). Twenty years ago, about
40 percent of the private sector workforce was covered by defined benefit
(DB) pensions, but this figure has been halved today.
Insurance Products for Mortality Risk
As discussed earlier, the responsibility for addressing mortality risks has
increasingly fallen on individuals rather than companies or the government.
Next we explore the use of individual insurance products to protect against
these risks.
Annuities
The main financial product for managing mortality risk is the annuity, which
transfers longevity risk from the individual to a private insurer.2 The main
reason people offer for buying these products involve their tax-deferral
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characteristics and investment growth potential, besides the lifetime payout
aspect (Brown et al., 1999; Sondergeld, Tumicki and Terry, 1999). For exam-
ple, when asked why they bought an annuity, 41 percent of recent buyers
cited the savings or favorable tax features; but only 12 percent mentioned
retirement income. In fact, fewer than a quarter of recent buyers understood
that their annuity had the ability to create a lifetime income stream!
Moreover, much of the growth in annuity assets reflects investment gains in
variable annuities, much of which has evaporated due to the recent decline
in stock prices; assets in fixed annuities were mainly level over the past
5 years. In short, the individual annuity market has grown, but this growth
may not reflect increased attention to the risk-management features of annu-
ities.3 Indeed each year, roughly one percent of deferred annuity assets are
annuitized; the vast majority of contract terminations result from surrenders
and exchanges (Beatrice, Drinkwater, and Sondergeld, 2002; Drinkwater,
Sondergeld, and Terry, 2002). Sales of immediate annuities have increased
somewhat but they remain a small fraction of total annuity sales and retiree
wealth.
Other consumer surveys also point to an under-utilization of payout
features. Individuals who retired 1998–2001 and had the opportunity to
take a lump sum distribution from their employer-sponsored retirement
plans were asked: Whether their plan had an annuity option available, and
whether they elected to receive an annuity (Sondergeld, Drinkwater, and
Albrycht, 2002a). Among retirees with a DB plan (including those who
additionally had defined contribution, DC plans), only 49 percent were
aware that an annuity payout option existed in their plans, and 17 percent
were “not sure” if this option was available. Among retirees with only a DB
plan, just 34 percent knew that their plans had an annuity option. Among
retirees who said that an annuity option was available, 21 percent chose the
option. However, among this same group, only half of those who had only
a DB plan chose the annuity payout option. Twenty-two percent of those
with both a DB and DC plan took an annuity; only 10 percent of those with
only a DC plan chose an annuity. The presence of a DB plan—even one
that offered lump sum distributions—thus appeared to promote annuitiza-
tion. With a continued decline in the popularity of DB plans, it seems plaus-
ible that the overall annuitization rates will fall further, unless people
become aware of and take advantage of annuity offerings in DC plans.
When annuitization does not occur directly from the employer plan
itself, it could happen after assets are transferred to some other retirement
portfolio such as a deferred annuity. Among the 51 percent of retirees who
chose to rollover the funds or take cash distributions, 14 percent said that
they invested the funds in an annuity. While it is unclear what type of annu-
ity these funds were invested in, given the small proportion of immediate
relative to total annuity sales we suspect the vast majority was invested in
deferred, not immediate, annuities.
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Another point is that even when individuals convert their assets into
income, they are not obliged to choose a lifetime payout. For annuitiza-
tions of deferred annuities, a lifetime payout feature is chosen by only one
quarter of annuitants according to a recent LIMRA study (Drinkwater and
Sondergeld, 2003). Ameriks (Chapter 13, this volume) explains how increas-
ing numbers of participants in one large DC plan have elected to delay or
avoid lifetime income payouts, in favor of systematic withdrawals and mini-
mum required distributions. The percentage of buyers choosing lifetime
income among immediate annuities has remained steady at approximately
60 percent from 1997 to 2001. Meanwhile, the proportion of married couples
choosing joint and last survivor coverage—which can help to address spousal
mortality risk—is also low (around 30 percent in 2001).
In sum, ownership of an annuity product is not synonymous with mortal-
ity risk transfer. Against the backdrop of falling traditional pension plan
coverage such evidence indicates that people are becoming less protected
over time from mortality risk.
Life Insurance
Another source of protection against mortality risk is life insurance. During
the retirement years, in-force life insurance can represent an additional
source of income, either from cash value withdrawals (from permanent
policies), or from conversion of the tax-free benefits following a spouse’s
death. Depending on the situation, individual life insurance or first-to-die
policies can be purchased on either or both spouses. Though many people
have this protection during their working years, life ownership drops off as
people retire from jobs and leave group coverage behind. Concomitantly,
retirees may find their individual term insurance policies expire, or they may
be unwilling (or unable) to keep up with scheduled premium increases.
Life insurance ownership among married people is more prevalent at ages
46–55 with 81 percent owning group or individual policies in 1998 compared
to age 66 or higher with 63 percent owning (Terry and Bryck, 1999). At older
ages, individually underwritten policies are likely to be prohibitively expens-
ive. This fact helps to explain the miniscule proportion of buyers over the
age of 60: among married individuals who bought individual life insurance
policies in 2001, only three percent were over 60 (unpublished data, LIMRA
International). When married people without life insurance die early in
retirement, this can expose surviving spouses to substantial hardship when
income sources are also cut off or sharply reduced.
Market Implications
We have argued that for many people approaching retirement, mortality
risks seem to rank low on a list of issues that includes more immediate
concerns such as prescription drug costs and plunging stock values. People
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tend to have difficulty envisioning their life, health situation, and finances
far into the future, and when they do not think that risks will befall them,
they may not be motivated to address these issues.
Of course, these challenges are not new for the annuity industry. To the
extent such biases are a natural feature of human decisionmaking, they
have been present for many years. Nevertheless, in the past, these risks
were covered by public (Social Security) and private (DB pension) sources.
In the future, both of these sources will recede, leaving people increasingly
exposed to mortality risks. As a result individuals are increasingly burdened
with the responsibility of protecting themselves.
In the United States, at least, the annuity industry has done a good job
emphasizing the asset accumulation phase. The next test for annuity pro-
viders will be to emphasize the product’s ability to convert assets into a life-
time income stream. Yet, an explanation of product features, by itself, will
not necessarily boost annuity sales or greater rates of annuitization. Companies
must also learn how their customers frame decisions involving mortality
risks, such as when to retire, whether to allow their life insurance policies
to lapse, whether to purchase life insurance or modify existing coverage,
and whether to annuitize a portion of their assets. Furthermore, they must
understand how other retirement risks are perceived and prioritized. Other
challenges for providers include compensation and product design. With
the shift from accumulation to distribution, companies may need to con-
sider innovative techniques to reward distribution partners who encourage
annuity owners to annuitize. To address other objections to annuitization,
providers should explore creative product designs. Already, more providers
are promoting the liquidity features of their immediate annuities. New
product designs may combine long-term care insurance with income annu-
ities which can help to offset adverse selection pressures. Income annuities
with inflation-indexed payouts should also be considered, which would not
only mitigate the longevity risk but inflation risk as well (Brown, Mitchell,
and Poterba, 2002).
Future Research
Further investigation is needed on conditions in which consumers tend to
insure against mortality and other retirement risks. There is no general
agreement yet regarding the optimal method of educating different types
of consumers, but research could help determine education techniques
which increase general subject knowledge and influence behavior (Clark
et al., Chapter 10, this volume; MacFarland, Marconi, and Utkus, Chapter 6,
this volume). For example, focus group participants that initially reacted
negatively to the concept of annuitization warmed to the concept after
discussing it for some time (Sondergeld, Drinkwater, and Jamison, 2002b).
During the focus groups, participants reacted to a series of scenarios of
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future income with and without annuitization. Graphic illustrations, show-
ing how saving can be drained over the course of a retirement may have
been instrumental in changing attitudes to annuitization. It would also be
useful to learn how consumers would prefer to plan for retirement. As
MacFarland, Marconi, and Utkus (Chapter 6, this volume) describe, retire-
ment education programs should reflect the heterogeneous nature of
peoples’ planning preferences. The financial services industry will then be
in a better position to find ways to effectively use insurance products to
manage retirement risks.
Notes
1 In accumulating a desired amount, L, by retirement, one needs to solve for
the annual contribution, p1, such that L  p1 * s(n1, i1) where s(n1, i1) 
[(1  i1)n1  1]/i1 and is the future value of an n1 period annuity certain that
earns i1% per period. Upon retirement, the payment, p2, is solved for and is
the amount of income that can be created from the accumulated amount L, such
that L  p2 * a(n2, i2) where a(n2, i2)  [1  (1  i2)
n2]/i2 and is the present
value of an n2 period annuity certain that earns i2% per period.
2 For an overview of life annuities’ importance in retirement security, see Mitchell,
2002.
3 Many annuity providers added enhanced death benefits, living benefits, and
other risk management features to their annuity products in recent years. It is not
known whether these new features are responsible for the majority of increases in
annuity sales.
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